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Academic productivity can be defined asa measurable output of a faculty mem-ber related to clinical, research, educa-
tion or administrative activities. Achieving the
best possible academic productivity is essential
for academic medical centres to maintain or nur-
ture recognition and good reputation.1 Further-
more, clinical productivity is essential for the
 survival of academic departments given the eco-
nomic realities in medicine.2
Strategies for productivity assessment help in
identifying highly productive faculty, determin-
ing areas for faculty and departmental improve-
ment,3 and implementing processes for promo-
tion and tenure.4 When coupled with reward
schemes, these strategies may improve produc-
tivity and compensation at both individual and
departmental levels. In the long-term, they may
enhance the ability to recruit and retain high-
quality faculty and achieve the academic mis-
sion of the department. However, these strate-
gies may have some unintended effects such as
using time dedicated to education to do more
clinical work.3 In addition, they may be chal-
lenging to  implement.3
We conducted a systematic review of the
effects of strategies introduced in academic med-
ical centres to assess faculty productivity, com-
pensation, promotion processes and satisfaction.
Methods
We defined productivity as a measurable activity
or a measurable output of an activity of a faculty
member. The considered areas of activity were
clinical, research, teaching and administration.
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Background: Many academic medical centres
have introduced strategies to assess the pro-
ductivity of faculty as part of compensation
schemes. We conducted a systematic review
of the effects of such strategies on faculty
 productivity.
Methods: We searched the MEDLINE, Health-
star, Embase and PsycInfo databases from
their date of inception up to October 2011.
We included studies that assessed academic
productivity in clinical, research, teaching and
administrative activities, as well as compensa-
tion, promotion processes and satisfaction.
Results: Of 531 full-text articles assessed for
eligibility, we in cluded 9 articles reporting on
eight studies. The introduction of strategies
for assessing academic productivity as part of
compensation schemes resulted in increases in
clinical productivity (in six of six studies) in
terms of clinical revenue, the work component
of relative-value units (these units are non-
monetary standard units of measure used to
indicate the value of services provided),
patient satisfaction and other departmentally
used standards. Increases in research produc-
tivity were noted (in five of six studies) in
terms of funding and publications. There was
no change in teaching productivity (in two of
five studies) in terms of educational output.
Such strategies also resulted in increases in
compensation at both individual and group
levels (in three studies), with two studies re -
porting a change in distribution of compensa-
tion in favour of junior faculty. None of the
studies assessed effects on administrative pro-
ductivity or promotion processes. The overall
quality of evidence was low.
Interpretation: Strategies introduced to assess
productivity as part of a compensation scheme
appeared to improve productivity in research
activities and possibly improved clinical produc-
tivity, but they had no effect in the area of
teaching. Compensation increased at both
group and individual levels, particularly among
junior faculty. Higher quality evidence about
the benefits and harms of such assessment
strategies is needed.
Abstract
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Literature search
We searched the following databases from their
date of inception up to October 2011: MED-
LINE, Healthstar, Embase and PsycInfo. The
search strategies included no language or date
restrictions (for details, see Appendix 1, available
at www.cmaj.ca/lookup /suppl /doi:10.1503 /cmaj
.111123/-/DC1). In addition, we screened the ref-
erence lists of included articles and relevant
papers and used the “related article” feature in
PubMed to identify additional studies. We con-
tacted the authors of studies that de scribed strate-
gies but did not report on their effects, seeking
any unpublished data. We also searched websites
of academic institutions and contacted experts in
the field as part of the scoping for this study.
Eligibility criteria
We included studies that evaluated faculty mem-
bers in academic medical centres; assessed the
effects of a productivity assessment strategy in -
troduced as part of appointment, promotion,
compensation or incentive schemes; and had
either no active comparison or a comparison
with the introduction of another productivity
assessment strategy.
Our main outcome measure was the effect on
productivity in at least one of four areas (clini-
cal, research, teaching and administration) either
at the individual (faculty) or group (department)
level. Additional outcomes of interest were the
effects on faculty compensation, promotion pro -
cesses and satisfaction. We were also interested
in other relevant academic, educational, clinical
and financial outcomes as well as negative unin-
tended consequences of the strategies.
We excluded reports if they described a pro-
ductivity assessment strategy but not its effects on
the outcomes of interest; if they described inter-
ventions not used as part of a productivity assess-
ment strategy (e.g., pay for performance, evalua-
tion of the quality of faculty teaching); and if the
strategies were related to concepts such as bench-
marking and faculty development. We did not
include conference proceedings.
Data selection and abstraction
Pairs of two reviewers independently screened
the titles and abstracts of identified records for
potential eligibility. We retrieved the full texts of
citations judged to be potentially eligible by at
least one reviewer. The groups of two reviewers
then independently screened the full texts for eli-
gibility and abstracted data using pilot-tested and
standardized forms. They resolved their disagree-
ments by discussion and, if necessary, with help
from an arbiter. We contacted authors to verify
our abstracted data.
Statistical analysis
We calculated the agreement between the re -
viewers for full-text screening using the kappa
statistic. The studies used different outcome
measurements and expressed results in various
statistical formats, which precluded the conduct
of meta-analyses. Thus, we summarized the
results in narrative and tabular formats. We
graded the quality of evidence using the GRADE
(Grading of Recommendations Assessment,
Development and Evaluation) approach5 and
assigned a grade of “high,” “moderate,” “low” or
“very low.”
Results
Study selection
Figure 1 shows the selection of studies for our
review. The nine eligible articles reported on
eight studies that evaluated eight different pro-
ductivity assessment strategies.3,6−13 Agreement
between reviewers for study eligibility was high
(κ value = 0.75). The authors of the eight studies
verified our abstracted data. We learned that
Excluded  n = 6184 
• Duplicates 
Excluded  n = 32 282 
Titles and abstracts of records 
screened for eligibility 
n = 32 813 
Records identi!ed through 
electronic database search  
n = 38 982 
Additional records identi!ed 
through other sources 
n = 15 
Studies included in quantitative 
synthesis (meta-analysis) 
n = 0 
Excluded  n = 522 
• Not about the introduction of a strategy  
for assessing faculty productivity  n = 486 
• Outcomes of interest not assessed  n = 36 
Studies included in qualitative 
synthesis 
n = 9 
Full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility 
n = 531 
Figure 1: Selection of studies for the review.
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seven of the strategies are still in use either in
their original form or in a modified version.6−13
Appendix 2 (available at www.cmaj.ca /lookup
/suppl/doi:10.1503/cmaj.111123/-/DC1) summa-
rizes 35 strategies described in 36 reports that we
excluded for not reporting on their effects.
Authors of nine of these reports responded to our
emails, indicating they had no data available on
the effects of their strategies.
Features of the strategies
Details of the eight productivity assessment
strategies evaluated in the included studies are
summarized in Table 1. The strategies were
reported between 1999 and 2008.
The development process was described for
three strategies and included literature review,
faculty input and creation of a special commit-
tee.3,6,11 The need for staff support for managing
productivity assessment was reported for four
strategies.3,6,8,11 Four strategies were described as
offering either web-based access9,11 or regular
feedback to faculty.8,10
A variable number of the reports provided spe-
cific and reproducible descriptions of the strate-
gies for assessing the four areas of productivity:
clinical (eight studies3,6−11,13), research (six3,6,9−11,13),
teaching (six3,6−8,11,13) and administrative (four3,9,11,13).
The strategies used one or more methods for
assessing the different areas of productivity, but
the methods were not consistent across these
strategies. The main measurement methods used
were the relative-value unit (six studies3,6−9,11), a
rating scale determined by departmentally based
standards (one13) and billable hours (one10). (The
relative-value unit is a nonmonetary standard unit
of measure used to indicate the value of services
provided; for a specific service, the unit is multi-
plied by a conversion factor to calculate the total
dollar amount assigned to that service.)
Features of the studies
Details of the included studies are summarized
in Tables 2 and 3. All of the studies were con-
ducted in the United States. In terms of design,
all of the studies were conducted at a single insti-
tution and were designed for different institu-
tional levels: six at the department level (four in
primary care6,7−9 and two in anesthesiology10,11),
one at the school level (school of medicine3) and
one at the level of academic centre (at the
 centre’s schools of medicine, nursing and den-
tistry13). All of the studies compared data col-
lected before with data collected after the imple-
mentation of the assessment strategy. Six studies
explicitly reported a retrospective approach to
data collection.3,6,7,10,11,13 The authors of the two
remaining studies confirmed that data collection
was prospective.8,9 None of the studies included
an active comparator.
The study populations were either restricted
to primary care physicians6−9 or anesthesiolo-
gists,10,11 or they were more inclusive (i.e., one or
more schools).3,13 Five studies reported the num-
ber of participants: 338 faculty in one study,9 and
a range from 35 to 64 faculty in the others.6−8,10
Of the eight studies, seven described the use of
their productivity assessment as part of a compen-
sation scheme.6−11,13 One of these seven studies
reported the use of the assessment also as part of
promotion and tenure standards.12
The numbers of studies assessing the outcomes
of interest were as follows: clinical productivity
(six3,6−9,11), research productivity (six3,6,9−12), teaching
productivity (five6,8−11), administrative productivity
(none), compensation (five7−11), promotion process
(none) and other outcomes (two3,7).
Risk of bias and overall quality of evidence
All eight studies used historical controls, and six
collected data retrospectively (Table 2).3,6,7,10,11,13
None of the studies used validated outcome mea-
sures. Many of the studies reported imbalanced
co-interventions (e.g., training in billing,7,8,10
introduction of a new rank system9 or improve-
ment in research infrastructure13 concomitant
with the introduction of the intervention) or other
confounding factors (e.g., better payer contract,7
concurrent increase in federal grant funding9).
Although we could not formally assess it, publi-
cation bias was possible. Similarly, included
studies did not report on all of the outcomes of
interest, or they reported on one but not all rele-
vant aspects of an outcome (e.g., they reported
on clinical productivity at the individual level but
not at the group level). This may, at least in part,
have led to selective outcome reporting. Conse-
quently, we judged the overall quality of the evi-
dence to be low.
Effects of the strategies
The effects of the strategies are summarized in
Table 3.
Clinical productivity
All six studies assessing clinical productivity
reported an increase in productivity in terms of
clinical revenue, the work component of relative-
value units, patient satisfaction and other depart-
mentally used standards.3,6−9,11 Three studies
reported increased productivity at the group lev -
el;3,7,8 one of these studies reported a simultane-
ous increase in productivity at the individual
level,8 one reported a decrease at the individual
level,3 and one did not report on individual pro-
ductivity.7 Two studies reported decreased group
Research
CMAJ, August 7, 2012, 184(11) E605
Table 1 (part 1 of 2): Description of strategies for the assessment of productivity of faculty reported by included studies 
Study 
Development 
of strategy 
Areas of productivity assessed 
Clinical Research Teaching Administrative 
Garson et al., 
19993 
Faculty survey, 
metrics committee, 
faculty feedback 
and testing 
• Private patient care 
measured in FTEs and 
RVUs 
• Community patient care 
• Patient satisfaction 
• Funded research 
• Unfunded research 
• Impact factor 
• Total direct-contact 
teaching hours 
• Teaching evaluation 
by learners 
Service on 
state/national 
committees 
Cramer et al., 
20006 
Comprehensive 
literature search, 
consensus process 
with faculty 
• RVUs based on clinical 
charges of faculty 
member’s clinical care 
sessions and clinic 
precepting sessions 
• RVUs for different 
services based on charge 
relative to that of CPT 
code 99123 (considered 
the unit RVU) 
• RVU based on number 
of publications, 
grants, presentations 
• For publications, RVU 
was based on the 
estimate of 240 hours 
to generate a paper 
worthy of publication 
(2 points/h x 240 h = 
480 points) 
RVU based on number 
and type of teaching 
activity, course 
directorship, curriculum 
design, teaching award 
No specific assessment 
method reported; 
compensation based on 
exceptional effort and 
special projects 
rewarded by the chair 
from an annual 
discretionary 
managerial incentive 
pool (5% of budgeted 
incentive funds) 
Sussman et al., 
20017 
Not reported wRVU based on Medicare/ 
Medicaid coding for 
evaluation and 
management 
Not reported • Measured as 
“devoted time” 
• Additional RVUs 
assigned per session 
of teaching 
Discretionary payment to 
primary care physicians 
(1% of productivity-
derived salary) based on 
commitment to group 
activities (e.g., arranging 
CME for the group, 
leading medical 
management meetings) 
Andreae 
et al., 20028 
Not reported • wRVU based on MGMA 
Physician Compensation 
and Productivity 
Survey14 
• Minimum wRVU = 70% 
(median wRVU for 
productivity of general 
pediatricians in MGMA 
survey14) 
• Excess wRVU multiplied 
by $/wRVU conversion 
factor14 
• Minimum wRVU and 
$/wRVU adjusted 
annually 
No specific assessment 
method reported; 
compensation for 
research effort 
negotiated with the 
chair or unit director 
wRVU teaching credit 
based on reported 
hours spent supervising 
medical students 
No specific assessment 
method reported; 
compensation for 
administrative effort 
negotiated with the 
chair or unit director 
Tarquinio 
et al., 20039 
Not reported • Based on RVUs in excess 
of those required to 
cover base salary 
• Dollar value of 
benchmark RVU ($/RVU) 
= benchmark salary 
(based on survey of peer 
institutions) divided by 
benchmark RVUs (based 
on MGMA academic 
RVU data or other 
sources) 
• Based on the value 
of grants/gifts 
relative to base 
salary or NIH salary 
cap and on being 
principal investigator 
on a research grant 
• “Research bonus” 
could be earned by 
clinician-educators and 
physician-scientists 
Not reported Additional RVU credits 
for important 
administrative 
responsibilities such as 
division compliance 
expert, course director 
or fellowship program 
director 
Miller et al., 
200510* 
Consultation with 
many groups, 
including private 
practitioners 
• “Credit” defined as 
billable hours collected 
minus expected hours 
• Billable hours based on 
actual delivery of 
anesthetic clinical care 
• Extra billable time given 
for specific clinical tasks 
(e.g., night or weekend 
work) but not for 
staffing more than one 
clinical site at a time 
No specific assessment 
method reported; 
instead of financial 
rewards, educators 
receive additional 
nonclinical time 
No specific assessment 
method reported; 
incentives based on 
teaching evaluations 
Not reported 
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productivity and increased individual productiv-
ity,6,11 with one describing an increasing work-
load undertaken by a stable number of full-time
equivalent faculty.11 One study reported in -
creased individual productivity but did not report
on group productivity.9
Research productivity
Five of the six studies assessing this outcome re -
ported increased research productivity in terms
of applications for funding,3 acquisition of fund-
ing,3,9,10,13 number of publications13 or some other
measure.6 The sixth study reported that the rate
of publication did not change after implementa-
tion of the strategy.11 Two studies evaluated re -
search productivity based on a point-based sys-
tem using either relative-value units6 or a scheme
developed by a departmental committee.11
Teaching productivity
Of the five studies that assessed this outcome,
two reported that the “educational output” was
stable11 or that the number of student and resi-
dent sessions did not change.8 Two studies re -
ported no change in student or resident evalua-
tions,8,9 and one re ported improvement in such
evaluations.10 One study reported a 4% drop in a
mean composite score for teaching.6 However,
that same study suggested that faculty were more
willing to participate in educational activities.
Compensation
One of the five studies that assessed this outcome
re ported an increase in compensation at the group
level by 8%,8 another reported an increase at the
individual level by 40%,11 and a third study re -
ported a “slight” increase at both levels.7 Two
studies reported a change in compensation distri -
bution in favour of junior faculty10,11 (defined in
one study as assistant professors10).
Other outcomes
One study reported improvement or no change in
patient satisfaction.7 That study showed varying
levels of satisfaction among faculty; satisfaction
was associated with “understanding of the plan”
and inversely associated with years of service.
Only one study provided some evidence about
shifts in area of productivity: faculty who were
not productive in their research work shifted to
patient care.3 None of the eligible studies assessed
effects on administrative productivity or promo-
tion processes.
Interpretation
We found that strategies introduced to assess fac-
ulty productivity as part of a compensation
scheme in academic medical centres appeared to
improve productivity in research activities and
possibly improved clinical productivity but had
no effect in the area of teaching. Compensation
increased at both the group and individual levels,
particularly among junior faculty. None of the
studies assessed effects on administrative pro-
ductivity or promotion processes.
Despite the low level of quality of the evi-
dence, the data suggest that the assessment of
faculty productivity, when coupled with an
appropriate compensation or incentive scheme,
Table 1 (part 2 of 2): Description of strategies for the assessment of productivity of faculty reported by included studies 
Study 
Development 
of strategy 
Areas of productivity assessed 
Clinical Research Teaching Administrative 
Reich et al., 
200811 
Chairperson 
advised by two 
committees to 
create valuations 
for activities 
• Point value scheme 
using the number of 
American Society of 
Anesthesiologists RVUs 
(ASA units) billed, 
adjusted for concurrent 
care 
• Call assignments 
Point valuation scheme 
and valuation by a 
departmental 
committee based on 
faculty-submitted 
quarterly reports of 
academic activities 
Point valuation scheme 
and valuation by the 
chair based on semi-
annual evaluation by 
residents and peers 
Point valuation scheme 
and valuation by the 
chair based on 
administrative 
functions assumed 
Schweitzer 
et al., 200712 
and 200813 
Committee of 
faculty and 
administrators 
• Measured against 
departmentally based 
standards 
• Rating from 0 
(unsatisfactory) to 4 
(outstanding) 
• Measured by grants 
and publications 
• Rating from 0 
(unsatisfactory) to 4 
(outstanding) 
• Measured against 
departmentally 
based standards 
• Rating from 0 
(unsatisfactory) to 4 
(outstanding) 
• Measured against 
departmentally 
based standards 
• Rating from 0 
(unsatisfactory) to 4 
(outstanding) 
Note: CME = continuing medical education, CPT = Current Procedural Terminology, FTE = full-time equivalent, MGMA = Medical Group Management Association, NIH = 
National Institutes of Health, RVU = relative-value unit (a nonmonetary standard unit of measure used to indicate the value of services provided; for a specific service, 
the RVU is multiplied by a conversion factor [dollar amount by unit of RVU] to calculate the total dollar amount assigned to that service), wRVU = work component of 
the RVU14 (under the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the RVU has three components: work, practice expense and professional liability insurance). 
*Strategy also described in Feiner et al.15 
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Table 2 (part 1 of 2): Design of studies evaluating the effects of the productivity assessment strategies 
Study (setting) Design Population Intervention Risk of bias 
Garson et al. 3  
(Baylor College of 
Medicine, Houston, Texas) 
Retrospective 
before–after 
comparison 
17 clinical science 
departments and 
8 basic science 
departments; 
n (faculty) not 
reported 
• ”Metrics process”; goals were set for 
each department for each area assessed 
(e.g., 10% increase in NIH grant 
dollars). 
• Individual and departmental 
performance data collected, analyzed 
and fed back yearly 
• Department-based compensation plans 
were in place (according to author; no 
further details provided) 
• Collected data 
retrospectively 
• Did not use validated 
outcome measures 
 
Cramer et al. 6 
(Department of Family 
Medicine, State University 
of New York at Buffalo, 
Buffalo, New York) 
Retrospective 
before–after 
comparison 
n (faculty) = 38–49 
 
• Relative-value–based incentive plan 
• Points totalled quarterly, used as the 
divisor for that quarter’s available cash 
• Cash value per point multiplied by 
provider’s point total 
• Collected data 
retrospectively 
• Did not use validated 
outcome measures 
 
Sussman et al.7  
(Division of General 
Medicine, Department of 
Medicine, Brigham and 
Women’s Hospital and 
Harvard Medical School, 
Boston, Massachusetts) 
Retrospective 
before–after 
comparison 
Employed academic 
primary care 
physicians; 
n (faculty) = 64 
• Productivity-based salary and bonus 
measures 
• Annual salary adjustments based on the 
prior year’s clinical productivity 
• Bonus measures paid quarterly based 
on medical management, quality of 
care, teaching and seniority 
• Magnitude of total bonus payments is 
based on percentage of the wRVU 
productivity-derived salary, to a 
maximum bonus of 10% 
• Collected data 
retrospectively 
• Did not use validated 
outcome measures 
• Reported imbalanced  
co-interventions (training 
in billing) and another 
confounding factor (better 
payer contract) 
Andreae et al. 8  
(Division of General 
Pediatrics, University of 
Michigan Health, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan) 
Before–after 
comparison 
(data collection 
probably 
prospective) 
n (faculty) = 35 • Productivity-based faculty 
compensation program that included a 
base salary and incentive payment 
• Once minimum wRVUs were generated 
to cover the base salary, excess wRVUs 
were converted to cash value as an 
incentive payment 
• Agreements for protected time or 
extramural salary support unaltered 
• Base salary independent of academic 
rank or years of service 
• Wages exclusive of benefits used for 
compensation 
• Collected data 
prospectively 
• Did not use validated 
outcome measures 
• Reported imbalanced  
co-interventions (training 
in billing) 
Tarquinio et al. 9 
(Department of Medicine, 
Vanderbilt University 
School of Medicine, 
Nashville, Tennessee) 
Prospective 
before–after 
comparison 
12 clinical divisions; 
n (faculty) = 338 
• Performance-based compensation plan 
that included a base salary and 
productivity adjustments 
• Productivity adjustments were paid 
when productivity exceeded amount to 
generate base salary 
• Clinician-educators and physician-
scientists given up front 20% and 80%, 
respectively, of clinical RVU benchmark 
• Base salary based on that of the year 
before the intervention was 
implemented 
• Benchmark salary based on survey of 
peer institutions 
• Cash value per RVU was specialty-
specific but unrelated to academic rank 
or track 
• Collected data 
prospectively 
• Did not use validated 
outcome measures 
• Reported imbalanced  
co-interventions 
(introduction of new rank 
system) and another 
confounding factor 
(concurrent increase in 
federal grant funding) 
Miller et al. 10  
(Department of Anesthesia 
and Perioperative Care, 
University of California at 
San Francisco, San 
Francisco, California) 
Retrospective 
before–after 
comparison 
Faculty with surgical 
and obstetric 
anesthesia 
responsibilities at 
three hospitals; 
n (faculty) = 58 
• Productivity-based compensation 
including a base salary and productivity 
adjustments 
• Expected hours arbitrarily 
predetermined as 7.5 h/d of assignment 
• No information provided on conversion 
of credit to cash value 
• Collected data 
retrospectively 
• Did not use validated 
outcome measures 
• Reported imbalanced  
co-interventions (training 
in billing) 
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can lead to positive systemic cultural change and
help to achieve a department’s mission.1 For
example, one of the included studies reported
that the strategy resulted in non-research faculty
volunteering for more teaching and administra-
tive responsibilities, which freed up research fac-
ulty to engage in scholarly pursuits.12
Assessment of productivity can have some
negative unintended consequences. Faculty
might assume that an item not being evaluated is
less important.3 For example, not considering
teaching productivity, or weighing it much lower
than clinical productivity, may affect faculty who
teach and hurt the mission of the department.
The productivity assessment strategy and the
compensation scheme should lead to proper rela-
tive compensation for the different areas. That
approach would ensure their alignment with the
mission of department and the goals of its chair.
Another unintended consequence may be dri-
ven by gaming the system, intentionally or not,
to score high on the productivity assessment with
disregard to quality (e.g., aiming to get good
evaluations rather than provide good teaching).
Clinical care and teaching are two areas vulnera-
ble to such effects. Appropriate and validated
measurement tools as well as an adequate culture
are needed to help avoid these situations.
There are a number of challenges to assessing
productivity (Box 1). The primary challenge is
how to measure productivity. Indeed, clinical
activities might not be equally intense (e.g., on-
call time intensity might vary depending on the
site), which makes availability a suboptimal
measure.3 Similarly, reimbursement for clinical
work may not be ideal because it can vary
depending on the site (county v. private clinic).
Also, it may be difficult to determine the equiva-
lent values across areas of productivity (e.g.,
clinical v. research). The most common approach
to achieving a fair assessment has been the use
of relative-value units. Different approaches have
been used to develop these units. Hilton and col-
leagues developed a base unit for each area of
productivity (clinical, teaching, research and
administration) and adjusted them so that the
total points for the presumed productivity of a
‘‘top producer’’ in each of the areas would be
equal.16 Cramer and colleagues proceeded by
agreeing on a relative-value unit for clinical pro-
ductivity (using a specific billing level) and then
determined equal points for equal effort in the
other areas by committee consensus.6 Others
developed scales that focused on one area only,
such as teaching.17
Although strategies for assessing productivity
can be used solely as evaluation tools (for both
departments and faculty), they are most often
used along with productivity-based compensation
programs to reward and stimulate productivity.
Typically, these programs place a percentage of
income at risk (e.g., 20%)11 and reward productiv-
Table 2 (part 2 of 2): Design of studies evaluating the effects of the productivity assessment strategies 
Study (setting) Design Population Intervention Risk of bias 
Reich et al. 11  
(Department of 
Anesthesiology, Mount 
Sinai School of Medicine, 
New York, New York) 
Retrospective 
before–after 
comparison 
n (faculty) not 
reported 
• Mission-based productivity compensation 
model with a base salary (based on rank 
and experience) and a supplemental pay 
(based on points earned) 
• Cash value of points based on finances of 
the department and total number of 
points generated by faculty in the 
preceding quarter 
• Compensation model placed 70% of total 
compensation at risk 
• Collected data 
retrospectively 
• Did not use validated 
outcome measures 
Schweitzer et al. 12,13 
(Health Sciences Center 
schools of dentistry, 
nursing and medicine, 
University of Louisville, 
Louisville, Kentucky) 
Retrospective 
before–after 
comparison 
n (faculty) not 
reported 
• Recruitment of endowed chairs and 
their teams 
• New promotion and tenure standards 
• Salary incentives linked to research 
productivity 
• Post-tenure review: faculty given an 
unsatisfactory review were reviewed 
again 2 years later; failed reviews 
triggered the creation of a faculty 
development plan 
• Improvements to the research infrastructure 
• The chair’s salary comprised a base salary 
and a salary supplement based on 
performance measures 
• Collected data 
retrospectively 
• Did not use validated 
outcome measures 
• Reported imbalanced  
co-interventions 
(improvement in research 
infrastructure) 
Note: NIH = National Institutes of Health, RVU = relative-value unit, wRVU  = work component of the RVU14 (see Table 1 footnote for description of RVU and wRVU). 
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ity beyond the expected minimum (marginal pro-
ductivity).18 Some have argued that an incentive
system focused on specific goals is more effective
than a productivity-based  program.1
A number of factors can affect the success of
productivity-based programs. Rewards should
not be based on thresholds that reward only
exceptionally productive faculty.6 At the same
time, they need to be incremental to avoid hitting
a “magic number” above which faculty loose
incentive for being more productive.6 Ideally,
reward schemes need to be aligned with and
adjusted regularly to local and national trends for
compensation,8 as well as to increases or de -
creases in departmental finances. The re wards
should be valuable enough (in monetary value)
to have an impact.18
Strengths and limitations
The main strength of this study is our adherence
to the high standards of conducting and reporting
systematic reviews.19 In particular, we used a
thorough process for selecting studies, abstract-
ing data and verifying the results directly with
the authors of the included studies.
The main limitation of our systematic review
is inherent in the available evidence and the low
methodologic quality of the studies and their
poor reporting. Another limitation is the general-
izability of the results. First, all of the results
were from academic centres in the United States.
Given different academic environments in other
countries, the findings may not apply elsewhere.
Second, the studies focused on primary care and
anesthesiology, and therefore the results may not
be applicable to other specialties.
Conclusion
Strategies introduced to assess faculty productiv-
ity as part of a compensation scheme appeared to
improve research productivity and possibly im -
proved clinical productivity but had no effect in
the area of teaching. Compensation increased at
both group and individual levels, particularly
among junior faculty.
Departments planning on introducing a strat-
egy to assess productivity need to carefully con-
sider the associated challenges, the uncertain
 benefits and the potential unintended effects.
Appendix 2 provides further examples of such
strategies. For academic medical centres to make
informed decisions about the future use of pro-
ductivity assessment strategies, they will need
higher quality evidence about the benefits and
harms of those strategies. Although cluster ran-
domized trials are conceptually feasible, they may
not be practical. Large controlled observational
or before–after studies with careful handling of
 confounding (through matching and adjustment)
could provide higher quality evidence. Also, a
central repository of strategies, processes and
measurement tools would be ideal to assist aca -
demic leaders in designing their own programs.
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Box 1: Challenges to assessing
productivity of faculty
• The best way to measure productivity is not
clear
• Faculty may have little or no control over
their productivity because of factors such as
clinic population, scheduling, staffing and
nonclinical demands.6 Similarly, productivity
in research activities may be affected by
factors such as the availability of
biostatistical and methodologic support.
• Implementation of a productivity assessment
strategy may be hampered by the lack of
timely and accurate billing data; dedicated
staff may be required for the collection,
verification and analysis of data.3,6,8
• In many cases productivity data are self-
reported and may require regular auditing.6
• Concerns about the fairness, accuracy and
timeliness of the process may negatively
affect faculty buy-in and need to be
adequately addressed.6
• The assessment of clinical productivity
typically does not account for teamwork and
may affect it negatively. As a result, some
have advocated the assessment of
productivity at the group level.7
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